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This thesis has bean written to include background knowledge in the
hietory of the Navy Department organization in order to better understand this
organization as it is established today.
During a tour of duty in the Pentagon ay work on the staff of the Chief
of Naval Operations with additional duty on the staff of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff brought ne into contact with nearly all elenents of the Navy Department
organization at the departnental level. I found cyself deficient in knowledge
as to the organisation at this level, and the historical implications.
There is no single up-to-date treatise on the organization of the Navy
Department, Interestingly enough, there is one for the Army. It is hoped that
this paper may help some of the Navy comptrollership students at the George ^asb
ington University in their preparation for duty at the department level.
n). L. Nelson, Major General U.S. Army National Security and the General Staff




Th« history of the Navy Oepartsent organization la divided into two
jAxBBiBB, The first phaae is prior to the introduction of the Bureau Syataa
in 1842, and the second phase starts with the introduction of the Bureau
Systen in 1842 and continues to the present day*
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The United States Navy had several systena of infomal organization at
the seat of the goyemneat prior to the enactnent of a law on April 3» 1798
establishing the Navy as an Execixtive Department with a chief officer called
the Secretary of the Navy, These early organizations were characterised by
their lack of foraality and leadership direotiveness. At best they were a
hodge-podge of expediency. It is nothing short of a iciracle that the United
States Navy survived its early history due to the lack of organisation at the
top. Probably only the lack of rapid cocinunicstion during that period of
history saved it from oblivion.
The first naval adsinietretion was under the control of the Continental
Congress through a Naval Committee conposed of nenbers of Congress. A
description of this first system of control follows!
During the R-^volutionary War, the superintending direction of the Navy
was coraasitteA, in the first instance, to a coniBittee of three neBbers of
Congress, viss Messrs. Deane, Lengdon, end Gadsden, who were, in October 1775,
required to fit out two swift sailing vessels.. .Having resolved to fit out two
sore vessels (30tb October) •• .four nenbers, Messrs. Hopkins, Hewes, R.H, Lee
and 0. Adans, were added to the Conmiittee; and when Congress by resolution of
13 December 1775 detemdned to build thirteen additional vessels of war, they
increased the nunber of the Naval Cosadttee so as to nake it consist of one
nenber fron each colony.
To this CoBcittee Naval subjects were generally referred, with sn Instruc-
tion to exanlne and report thereon, for the final decision of the House.. .The
Conmiittee was authorised to give such instructions for the employnent of the
^£K .; 'v:jjc
•hips 88 Bight appear to then "vtofit conducive to the defense of the United Colo-
nies y and to the distress of the enemr's naval forces and vessels bringing
supplies to their fleets and anties.**
In perfondng the duties assigned then^ the Committee experienced great
inconvenience for vant of professionsl practical Inforaation, and upon the
subject being brought before Congress, they resolved (Kovember 6, 1776) "that
three persons, well skilled in meritiaie affairs, should be iisnediately appointed
to execute the business of the Navy, under the direction of the Xaritise
Coitsittee ,
This system of administering the civil depsrtnent of the Navy continued,
it is believed, till October 1779, when Congress, by resolution (28th) decided
that a Board of Adiriralty should be established, "to consist of three
eoanissioners, not members of Congress, and two members of Congress; any
2
three to form a board for the dispatch of business."
Thus the second step in the evolution of the Nsvy organization was the
establishment of a Bosrd of Admiralty in 1779, consisting of three commissioners
and two members of Congress. In 1781 Congress resolved that there should be a
Secretary of Marine, However, this position was never filled and the position
fell by default to Secretary of Finance, Robert Morris, until he resigned
in 1784^, No one was appointed to fill his place, as the Navy had been
practically demobilized. The last ship of the Revolutionary Wsr was sold in
1786,
In 1789, Congress established the War Department and gave the Secretary
of War authority to manage both the Any and the Navy, This system continued
for nine years, during which the Navy became important again due to the
*Charles W, Goldsborough, The United States Naval Chronicle (Washington, Printer
James Wilson, 182^;), pp, 6,7«
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plratlcal actiona of the Barbaiy States. In 1794 Congz*e88 passed a bill
prcviding for six frigates. Threat of war with France also increased interest
in the size of the Kevy.
As a result of these outside pressures » Congress passed a bill creating
• Bavy Department with the Secretary of Havy as chief officer, snd President
4dnis signed the bill on April 3, 1798. Thus, the Navy Departinent organization
passed its first icilestoneo
The original Navy Dcpartasent organization was couposed of a Secretary,
a chief clerk (^foldsboro) with three assistant clerks, and a chief accountant
with six clerks. There were two adaiinistrstive divisions, the Secretary's
office and the 8ccou2xtant*8 office, ill mesbers of this nanageeient teas were
civilians. This all-civilian organization endured through the war with France,
the Tripolitan War, and the War of 1812 with Ingland, The extra work load
of the War of 1812 was met by adding five clerks in the Secretary's office
and five clerks in the Accountant's office*
The far of 181^2 had shown the Secretary of the Navy Jones that be needed
professional assistance in managing a naval war. Consequently, he proposed to
Congress that the all-civilian headquarters be augBsented by professional
assistance to the Secretary. As a iresult of this reco»»endation. Congress
passed a bill in 1815 adding a Board of GoBtKiesioners of three post-Captains
appointed by the President and confirned by the Senate
With the enaetnent of this bill, the evolution of the Navy Departipent
organization passed its second milestone, and at the sane tiae set the scene
for the first conflict, i.e., civilian versus military or more basic, the
authority of the civilian secretary*
The conflict with the Secretary and the Commissioners centered in control

of fleet noveBtents. President Msdison backed Secretary Crowlnshield In
the dispute with the result that the principle of civilian control was firmly
entrenched. The CoiRBtissioners were to advise the Secretary on the nateriel
needs of the Navy with the Secretary retaining coKplete doninance of ship
BoveKente, personnel, and discipline*
As a sidelight, it is interesting to note that in 1817 the office of the
accountant in the Navy was abolished and the duties transferred to the
auditor's office of the Treasury Depart»ent, This move left the Navy Departnent
with two adninistrative divisions, the Secretary's office and the Navy
Coacuaissioner* s office*
This period of the Navy saw the introduction of steam and iajproved
ordnance (shell guns and pivot guns). The transition was slow and arduous,
being opposed by the older line officers. The organization of the Navy Depart-
•at was blaned by iiany to be the basic reason for so such resistance to change*
One of the strongest critics of the Navy organization at this time was a writer
by the nane of "Harry Bluff", probably Lieutanent Uaury. In attacking the
Board of Coirj&issioners systen of administration, he stressed the theme that
"in divided power there is no lndividt;al responsibility," He rccoicniended a
Bureau system with the chiefs responsible to the Secretary who «ras to have
one principal military executive. This type of organization was supposed to
reaedy the vascillations and indecieiono of the plural headed organization xmdor
the Board of Cocmissioners, However, Cbngrese only carried out half of the
"Harry Bluff" roco-nendotion. They passed a bill providing for the Bureau





Rs-vy D«partBeat Organization Under the Bureau Sjttea
1842-1909 Bureau Systea
1909*1915 Havel Aides Superlnposed on Bureau Syatea
1915-1942 Bureau Systec aiodifled by Chief of Haval Operation*






On August 3I9 1942 the ITavy Departisent was organised Into the Bureau
Sjstes by leglslatiye action of Congress* This basic systeii of decentralised
top BiaaageBent has continued in existence to the present dsy with soiie
nodi ficatIons. The first of these Rodifications was the "Aide Systen" estab-
lished in 1909 to assist and advise the Secretary of the Navy* The "Aide
System* gave way to the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations in 1915*
The "Bureau Systerf* with the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations super-
inposed has continued to tKis dste with modifications during and after World
War II to add other coordinating and controlling offices between the bureaus
and the Secretary. Thus the trend during the second phase of the Navy
organisation has b<?en froo decentralization by functions to a centralization
approeching but never arriving at a general staff systea*
The "Bureau Systen" was estsblished by Congress to overcome the deflcienciei^
of Navy Departsent organization under the Board System. Five bureaus were
established as follows:
Bureau of Navy Yards and Docks
Buresu of Construction, Bqulpoent snd Repair
Bureau of Provisions and Clothing
Bureau of Ordnance end Hydrograjdiy
Buresu of Medicine and Surgery
Eseh bureau was headed by a Bureau Chief, appointed by the President for an
indefinite period, confirmed by the Senate and responsible to the Secretary*
The duties of esch bureau were described by the Secretary* Each bureau chief's
orders had the full ^orce and effect of the Secretary.








Fleet Operations and Readiness Intelligence
Legal
•xeept as exercised personally by the Secretary of the Havy. This becane
•XT' evident with the oiitbreak of the Civil War and, as a consequence, Congress
passed a bill on July 31, 1861 creating the Office of As.' istant Secretsiy of
the Navy to aid the Secretary to coordinate and direct the Bureau Systen
organization. President Lincoln chose Gustevus V. Fox, a Navy veteran, for
this executive position to serve Secretary of Navy Gideon Welles as a Chief
of Staff during the Civil War,
In addition to the creation of the Assistant Secretary position, the Navy
Dopartsent Bureau ^sten organization was modified by Secretary Welles to
coordinate, control, plan, advise, and assist his in the administration of
the Department bj the creation of many boards end agencies. In addition the
noober of bureaus was enlarged to eight by Congressional action on July 5$ 1862
on the recoD^mendation of the Secretary of the Navy as follows!
Bureau of lards and Docks
Bureau of Equijartent and Recruiting
Bureau of Navigation
Buireau of Ordnance
Bureau of Construction end Repair
Bureau of Steam Engineering
Bureau of Provisions and Clothing
Bureau of Medicine and Sorgery
During the period from 1861 to 188i^, various secretarys delegated their
responsibilities in the fields of personnel, intelligence, and ship movements
to the Bureau of Navigation* The Bureau of Equipment and Recruiting took over
the ^drograjAic office and Naval Observatory. In addition Congress passed
a bill in 1880 authorizing a Judge Advocate General. The trend of decentralised
departmental organization on a functional baais continued. The period from 1842

to 1885 sew the spread of functionsl decentralization froa Navy headquarters
to the field. As a result » each bureau maintained and controlled a piece of
each Naval establishsent. This syteo of pieceoeal authority becase a
politician's dreaa, especially in Navy yards. The situation beeaoe so
intolerable froa the point of view of effective and efficient administration
of field activities that in 1885 Secretary Whitney made several changes in
bureau duties. He centralised purchasing and accounting in the Bureau of
Provisions and Clothing and changed its naate to Supplies and Accounts*





in 1889, Secretary Tracy continued Secretary Whitney's piecemeal organic
sational reforms to restore some cohesion to the fragmented Navy Department
organization. He created a Board of Construction composed of the chiefs of
the five material buz>eau8* He assigned the function of fleet operations to
the Bureau of Navigation*
During the period 1842 to 1909, the line officers of the Navy felt that
there was a need for a coordinating effort between the bureaus and the Secretary'
as well as top level military advise and control of fleet operations and war
plans. During and after the Civil War there was agitation on the part of line
officers for m greater share in the control of the Navy Department and the Navy,
In 1865 Congreae defeated a bill to establish a Board of Admiralty. In 1869
the Grimes Bill to create a Board of Survey passed the Senate but failed in the
House. For about five months. President Grant's first Secretary, Mr, Borle,
allowed Admiral Porter to operate as his chief executive. In 1882, Rear




Thus It can aaally be 8«en that there were imdereurrents In the NaTy to
create a general staff, or at any rate to improve on the Bureau Systooi by having
an agency or office handle the aiilitary business of the Navy. This coo*
troverey lasted a long tine in the Havy and was the subject of nany reports*
The year 1909 was a busy one in the history of the Navy organizationp
On January 12, Secretary Newberry proposed a plan of reorganization to
President Roosevelt, President Roosevelt appointed a Board to analyze the
iewberry plan. This board was headed by foraer Secretary of the Navy Moody.
Its report) known as the Moody Report, is a classic on organization of a
military department in a desocracy. It dwelt on the dualisa of a Secx*etai7*8
duties, i«e., civil and nilitary*
President Roosevelt forwarded the Moody Report to Congress for appropriate
action*
In the neantine, Mr. Meyer had assuned the Secretaryship. He ordered a
Naval Board of officers to analyse the Newberry Plan. This board, headed by
Rear Adniral Sparry, returned a repox^ at variance with the Newberry Plan*
The resultant hearings before Congress resulted in a verbal duel between
the line and staff officers of the Navy with neither winning*
In the meanwhile, Secretary Meyer referred the problem of the organisation
of the Navy to the Swift Board, with Rear Admiral Swift presiding. This





Based on the Swift Report, Secretary Meyer instituted the system of aid^s




organization on the Bureau Syvten*
The next step in the modiflcetion of the Bureau Syaten was the establish*
sent of the Office of CJhlef of Haval Operations as a result of the conflict of
personalities and purposes between Secretary of the Navy Josephus Daniels
and &di!)iral Fiske^ his aide for operations. Secretary Daniels did not like
the "side systerf" and preferred to deal directly with the bureau chiofs, thus
enhancing his own prestige and power. Adairal Fiske forced the issue by
going direct to Congress, with the resultant legislation on 3 March 1915
creating the Office of Chief of Naval Operations, charged with the operations
of the fleet and with preparedness and readlnass of plans for its use in war©
With the passage of this bill, Secretary Daniels abolished the Aide Systen*
During the Congressional hearings on the establii^UBent of the Office
of Chief of Haval Operations and subsequent aodificatlons during World War I,
the pros and oons of the iCJeneral Staff were argued. The usual fears of
llitary power over civilian control were voiced, and the usual rivalry
between staff end line were aired.
After World War I, Congress investigated the organization of the Havy
Departnent based on Admiral Sims* criticisn. Secretary Daniels defended the
organisation end was bitterly opposed to the General Staff S^sten*
The period fr<MB World War I to World War II saw little basic change in
the Wavy Department organization of the Biu:«au System with the Office of Chief
of Naval Operations superimposed. In 1921, the following were created!
Established Bureau of Aeronautics
Established Budget Office
Established Navy lard Coordination
With the exception of the addition of the Office of the Chief of Naval
Operations, the Navy Department organization entered World War II with little
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ohange sinoe 1842* The President (Rooeevelt) changed this by an executlTe
order making the Chief of Meval Operatlona reaponsible for the Havy directly
to the President as Coaaiander in Chief through the Secretary of the Navy, The
staff of the Chief of Naval Operations then becane a virtual general staff
under Adairal King. This continued throughout World War II, but iimedlately
thereafter Secretary Forrestal, being ever fearful of Adoiral King's power as
CND end being desirous of assuadng full civilian control, obtained pAraisslon
froB the President to revert to the for»er system of divided power anong
the nilitery in the Navy Departnent*
However, the general post-World War II trend was for centralisation of
organization to pronote efficiency and economy in the Defense establlshnent*
Lb a result the Navy Department established a series of offices under the
Secretary to provide for coordination and control of the bureau functions ss
follows
s
Office of Naval Material
Office of Naval Research
Office of Industrial Relations
Office of Comptroller
Office of Adainistrative Asristant to the Secretary of the Navy
Office of Analysis and Review.
These offices were in addition to the traditional:
Office of Judge Advocate General
Office of General Counsel
Office of Petroleum and Oil Shale Reserves
In addition to the estsblishfent of top nanagenent coordinating offices
for the Secretary of the Navy, the other post World War II develojMsent of
•Ignifloance has been the establishment of Assistant Secretaryships for Per-
sonnel, Material, and Financial Management. These additions have improved




Th» lavy Departaent organization of today has evolved froic the "Bui^edu
System" established by Act of Congress in 18ii2, Changes to the organisation
have b«en gradual , hare occnrred mainly during and iBanediately after wars,
and have never been radical. The general trend has been from decentralization
by function to a oonbination of decentralization by function and centralisation
by purpose. The natural and correct assumption, then, is that the Navy
Department organization as it exists today la a coBpromise between the
external conflicting interests and the internal conflicting interests. The
purpose of these conclusions is to review these conflicts and to analyse
the organisation restilting therefrosi*
The DepartBent of the Havy exists to carry out national policy. The
organisation of the Navy Department is an Instrument to accomplish this
purpose, in other words it is only a means to an end. Until the turn of
this century, when the United States emerged as a national power, our
national policy was not well defined. 4s a consequence. Naval policy was
not definitive. Admiral Stephen B. Luce lamented this lack of Naval policy
as early as 1882.^
Assuming that there is a definite national policy, which is true today,
then why is there any difficulty in organizing the Navy as an instrument of thcjt
policy? The difficulty lies in historical precedent and a conflict of
Interests, externally and internally to the Navy, What is the basis for
these conflicts? The basis is the dual nature of a military organization, l,e«,
civil and militax^. This dualistic nature of a military organisation was not




r«cognl2«d when the Ifsvy "Bureau Systeic** was established in 1842, The cItII
functions of the organlaation wei^ provided for, but the military functions
were neither provided for nor even recognized. The evolution of the present
organization has been a struggle to bring these dual functions into balance.
Stephen B, Luce recognized this dualisE in 1388,^ In nsors recent tiases, there
has been a reenphasis of this philosophy of the duality of means in a adlitary
5
organization to acooaplish the objective. A.nd unless one understands and
believes in the dual nature of a military organization, a clear understarMiing
of the conflicting interests which control the nature of the Navy Department
organization is not possible*
The external conflict that has shaped the Navy Departoent organization
is the basic struggle for power between civilian and nilitary. In the case
of the Navy, it could probably be Bore appropriately termed a fear on the
part of civilians of ailitary control of military might. Those elenents of
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Th»M elTllian eleBsnts have exercised control of the nilltary through the
power of position, purse, and opinion, Although ell three elesents of the
oiTilian block have recognlased the need over the years for a centralization of
knowledge, responsibility, and authority in the Navy Departnent, they have
opposed changes in this direction, always waving the fearful flag of
militarisB as the STOF signal.
ind what about the internal conflicting interests? Do the militaxy
in the Navy put up a united front for a siore cohesive organization? The
answer is no* The internal conflict is between the staff and the line and
the struggle is for power, prestige snd position. The tag of staff and
line struggle may be misleading, as it is not exactly Staff Corps versus line
officers, k better description would probably be "Bureau Oriented Naval
Officers" versus "Navy Oriented Naval Officers". Why are officers oriented
to a bureau instead of the Navy? Because the bureaus have been the trsdltioo*
al evenuee to higher education, position, prestige, fand promotion. Power
has been centered in the bureaus, and as a result, personnel has been
oriented toward the source of power. Even the undergraduate education at
Annapolis is tailored to the technical needs of the bureaus
T
The Navy's good record in both war snd diplonacy has been largely due
to the fact that its officers have been educated in these lines. Unfortunately,
no education can prepare nan for all careers, snd in certain other activities
the Navy has done unsatisfactory work.
0ns of these lesser fields is Bdainistretion. Annapolis hss never
been noted as a school of either Industrie! management or civil administration,
but its graduatee often find th«=B>.selves iiinning the h>ige Industries maintained
in connection with naval bases and facing complex business problems. An
occasional officer betrays a flair for this type of work, but in general the
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lewl of Banagement is balow i^at would be expected in private business.
This book has discussed the »ein difficulty at Annapolis ~ naaely, the
iaposaibility under present nethods of providing a sufficiency of both technicsj.
and general education*
And what about the Navy Department organization that has resulted from the^*
internal and external interests that conflict yet agree the best comproBise it
devisiveness? To begin with the Navy is big, complex, complicated, controlled
by "outsiders", leadership personnel functionally oriented, and, probably
most important, no yardstick to measure accomplishment. Without the profit
motive, it is difficult to apply the presently accepted rules of good
organization. However, discounting this, if the rules are applied to any part
of the Wavy Department organization, the results are gratifying.
The weakness of the Navy Department organization has not been in the
parts but in the whole. The weakness has been lack of Navy-wide planning^
policy coordination, and control to make Navy policy an integral part of
national policy. The initial step in the right direction was the establishment
of the Office of Chief of Naval Operations in 1915 • The next step was the
^ntrellzation of power, authority, and responsibility in the Chief of Naval
Operations by executive order in 1942. The tird step was the establishment of
the Defense Organization during World War II, including the Joint Chiefs of
Staff. But by far the biggest step was the enactment of the Unification Act
with aubaequent amendments. This step centered responsibility and authority
in the Secretary of Defense end prevented the Navy Department organization from
drifting back to its pre-World War II days of fragmentation*
If the Navy is so large, and complex, and complicated, and cannot be
measured by results in the business sense of the word, then what criteria can




be used to evaluattt its present status? These ares
1, Is the organization ready for total war? Probably as ready 8S any
ever have been although none ondurad a war without changes,
2« Is the organisation ready for border wars? Probably, now that we
have had the experience of Korea which showed up soaie planning defects*
3» Is the organization ready for a long, drawn-out cold war? Probably,
but here nay be its acid test. Problen area is to motivate econ(»Qr and
efficiency based on the concept of the greatest defense for the dollar*
Results since Korea have not been too gratifying, especially to Congressnen*
^. Is the organization geared to neah with the Oepartsent of Defense
organization and other government departxents and agencies? Not exactly,
but then naybe the Departi^nt of Defense organization is out of step. The
large nuiiber of Assistant Secretaryships hss fragnented functions in the
Departnent of Defense to the point of confusion and overlapping. The present
stiady by the Rockefeller CoBicission nay recomsend a reduction. The service
••tup of a Secretary, Deputy and four Assistants for Personnel, liaterial^
Research and Developsient , and Finance looks to be the better*
In conclusion, the Navy Departnent as now organized is the best in its
history. It is a strange oonpromise of functional decentralization (bureaus)
and centralized purposes (offices) . It has done, is doing, and is ready to
do a good job. The big problen, in the long haul of peaceful coexistence.
Bay be to discover a neans of motivation toward efficiency and econoaiy. Whethsjr
this can be done through the present organization remains to be seen. Anyone
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